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PARTIES 
The appellant is plaintiff Ira Sachs ("Sachs"). The appellees are defendants 
United Park City Mines Company ("United Park"), Joseph S. Lesser ("Lesser") and Loeb 
Investors Co. XL ("Loeb"). Sachs has not appealed the dismissal with prejudice of 
defendant Capital Growth Partners LLC ("Capital Growth") and therefore Capital 
Growth is not a party to this appeal. (R. 2191-95; Sachs Brief at 5.) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over this appeal from the Order Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
("Final Judgment") entered by the trial court on February 15, 2006. (R. 2213-22.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Real Estate Brokers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61 -2-1 et seq. (2005); 
2. Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004); and 
3. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS 
L NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Sachs alleges that he entered into an oral finder's fee agreement with Lesser and 
Loeb to find a purchaser for United Park. (R. 9.) Sachs further alleges that he "found" 
Gerald Jackson ("Jackson"), a real estate developer, who formed Capital Growth to 
purchase United Park. (R. 17.) Sachs alleges that United Park breached the alleged 
agreement when it refused to pay him a finder's fee after the transaction between Capital 
Growth and United Park closed. (R. 17-18.) The trial court granted summary judgment 
in favor of United Park on the grounds that Sachs' claims are barred by the Utah Real 
Estate Broker's Act and the Utah Statute of Frauds. See Minute Entry Decision (R. 2208-
12.) The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of United Park on the 
grounds that the undisputed material facts demonstrate that no enforceable express or 
implied oral finder's fee agreement was ever entered into between Sachs and United Park 
and that the alleged agreement does not include all of the required material terms, such as 
the amount of the fee, and therefore was merely an agreement to agree. (Id.) 
Sachs also asserted claims against Capital Growth for breach of contract and 
quantum meruit. (R. 17-20.) The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Capital Growth on these claims. See Order Granting Capital Growth Partners LLC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Capital Growth Order") (R. 2191-95.) Sachs has not 
appealed the Capital Growth Order. (R. 2191-95; Sachs Brief at 5.) 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. On January 26, 2004, Sachs filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Complaint"). (R. 1-27.) 
2. The Complaint alleges the following five Counts: (a) Count I - Declaratory 
Judgment; (b) Count II - Breach of Contract; (c) Count III - Quantum Meruit - Contract 
Implied in Law; (d) Count IV - Quantum Meruit - Contract Implied in Fact; and (e) 
Count V - Intentional Interference with Economic Relations. (R. 16-21.) 
3. On February 19, 2004, Lesser and Loeb filed a Motion to Dismiss. United 
Park and Capital Growth joined in the Motion. (R. 31-53; 54-57.) On September 29, 
2004, the trial court issued a Ruling and Order denying the Motion. (R. 157-90.) 
4. United Park and Capital Growth filed an Answer on October 13, 2004. 
Loeb and Lesser filed an Answer on October 15, 2004. (R. 193-206; 207-18.) 
5. On January 20, 2005, Capital Growth filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Capital Growth Motion"). (R- 525-27.) 
6. On March 31, 2005, Loeb and Lesser filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Loeb Motion"). The Loeb Motion sought dismissal of all five Counts against 
Lesser and Loeb alleged in the Complaint. (R. 1082-84.) 
7. On April 8, 2005, United Park filed its Motion for Summary Judgment 
("United Park Motion"). The United Park Motion sought dismissal of all five Counts 
against United Park alleged in the Complaint. (R. 1206-08.) 
8. The trial court heard oral argument on the Capital Growth Motion on July 
27, 2005. On August 11, 2006, the trial court issued its Minute Entry granting the Capital 
Growth Motion. (R. 2160-62.) The trial court entered the Capital Growth Order on 
September 13, 2005. (R. 2191-95.) 
9. The trial court heard oral argument on the United Park Motion and the 
Loeb Motion on December 12, 2005. On February 6, 2006, the trial court issued its 
Minute Entry Decision granting the Motions. (R. 2208-12.) The trial court entered the 
Final Judgment on February 15, 2006. (R. 2213-22.) 
10. Sachs filed his Notice of Appeal on March 16, 2006. (R. 2224-25.) The 
appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals on March 23, 2006. (R. 2228.) 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The following undisputed facts are material to the United Park Motion:1 
1. United Park is a Delaware corporation whose "principal business . . . is the 
leasing, development, and sale of real property located in or near Park City, Utah." (R. 2-
3; 1210.) 
2. United Park "owns the surface estate to more than 8,300 acres of land." (R. 
3.) This real property is United Park's "only asset of any significance whatsoever." (R. 
1210, 1257.) 
3. In 1999, United Park was in the process of obtaining approvals to develop 
two real estate projects: the Flagstaff Mountain Resort Project and the Bonanza Flats 
Project ("Projects"). (R. 3-4; 1210.) 
4. In July 1999, United Park "entered into a letter of understanding with DMB 
Associates, Inc. ("DMB") to form a joint venture to develop" the Projects. (R. 4; 1210.) 
5. This joint venture was "dissolved" on January 17, 2001. (R. 4; 1211; 
1261.) 
6. In late December 2000 or early January 2001, Jackson and Hank Rothwell, 
the president of United Park, had "serious discussions" about the possibility of 
purchasing United Park themselves. (R. 1211; 1261.) 
1
 These facts are either alleged by Sachs in his various pleadings or undisputed by Sachs 
in response to the United Park Motion. 
7. Approximately two weeks after these initial discussions, Rothwell told 
Jackson that he was not interested in purchasing United Park but that Jackson should "go 
ahead [and] take a run at it." (R. 1211; 1261.) 
8. In January or February 2001, an article appeared in the newspaper that 
discussed the dissolution of the joint venture with DMB. (R. 5; 1211.) 
9. After publication of this article, it "was public information that [United 
Park] was in play [and] publicly for sale." (R. 1211; 1255.) 
10. Sachs testified that he understood from reading this same article that "it was 
apparent that someone would come in and pick up the ball" from DMB. (R. 1211; 1267.) 
11. In March 2001, Sachs arranged a meeting between United Park and Granite 
Construction Company ("Granite"), a California development company with which he 
"had an established business relationship." (R. 5; 1211.) 
12. During this meeting, Granite and United Park discussed both an 
"acquisition" of United Park by Granite and a "joint venture" between Granite and 
United Park to develop the Projects. (R. 1212; 1266.) 
13. Granite proposed a joint venture whereby Granite would construct 
improvements to United Park's real property in lieu of providing any up-front cash to 
United Park for the joint venture. (R. 1116.) 
14. Sachs testified that at no time before or after this meeting did he have any 
direct discussions with Rothwell or anyone else at United Park about his expectation of 
getting paid a finder's fee by United Park in connection with a possible transaction with 
Granite. (R. 1212; 1265; 1271.) 
15. Subsequently, Marne Obernauer ("Obernauer"), a business associate of 
Lesser, called Lesser, pursuant to Sachs' request, to arrange a lunch meeting between 
Sachs and Lesser in New York. (R. 23.) 
16. During his call to Lesser, Obernauer mentioned something about Granite, 
but did not know any details about the company. Lesser requested that Obernauer 
provide information about Granite prior to the lunch meeting. (R. 1117; 1176-77.) 
17. Sachs arranged for a written brochure about Granite to be sent to 
Obernauer, The brochure "showed the extensiveness of their real estate development all 
over the country. Obernauer sent the Granite brochure to Lesser prior to the lunch 
meeting. (R. 1117; 1176; 1194; 1267.) 
18. On or about May 2, 2001, Sachs, Lesser and Obernauer met for lunch in 
New York City. (R. 5; 1117; 1150; 1177; 1212.) 
19. Sachs testified that during the lunch, Sachs and Lesser "talked extensively 
about Granite" and "that's about it." Sachs did not ask Lesser if United Park "was in 
negotiations with anyone else" nor did Sachs discuss with Lesser "any other potential 
buyer [or] joint venture partner by name." (R. 1212; 1269.) 
20. Sachs testified that the only "non-commonly known information" that he 
learned during the lunch was that Loeb, the controlling shareholder of United Park, was 
dissatisfied with Rothwell and felt that the "sooner they got [United Park] sold, the better 
it was." Sachs did not view this information as "confidential." (R. 1212-13; 1273.) 
21. Sachs testified that during the lunch, "nothing at all" was said about a 
finder's fee. Indeed, Sachs admits that at no time has anyone affiliated with United Park, 
including Lesser or Rothwell, told him that he would be paid a finder's fee if he found a 
buyer for United Park. (R. 1213; 1270; 1280-81.) 
22. Approximately two months after the meeting between Granite and United 
Park, Sachs sent a letter to Rothwell on May 17, 2001, regarding Granite. This letter was 
drafted with the assistance of Sachs' counsel at Prince Yeates. (R. 9; 1213; 1276-77.) 
23. The May 17, 2001, letter states in its entirety as follows: 
I am delighted that my introducing United Park City Mines to 
Granite Land Company appears to be heading in the right 
direction and I am pleased that the confidentiality letter has 
been signed. I certainly will continue to do everything in my 
power to bring together a mutually satisfactory agreement 
between these two parties. I took this opportunity to express 
this commitment to your chairman, Joe Lessor (sic), when he 
invited me to lunch at the Sky8Room in New York in early 
May. 
I perceive this venture as joining two entities with the 
potential of creating one of the nations premier skiing and 
real estate developments. In other words, I think that both 
parties are in the right place at the right time. I hope you 
agree. 
In that lunch with Joe Lesser, I was delighted to find that he 
seems to share our enthusiasm for this joint venture. I hope 
that this feeling is generally shared by the rest of your board. 
Most potential JV land development partners would still 
require a Granite Construction to do the development 
infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that capability. 
Joe gave me his encouragement to "get the job done." 
I write this letter to remind you that I will expect a modest 
finder's fee if an agreement comes to fruition. This could be 
cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or 
some other consideration acceptable to both of us. While I 
believe we have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I do 
think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the table 
early on, and I hope that you feel the same. 
Please let me know if you have any questions about such a 
finder's fee. 
I look forward to continuing our quest to link these two 
parties for everyone's benefit, including the shareholders who 
overwhelming (sic) expressed their approval. 
(emphasis added) (R. 1283) (Attached hereto as Addendum 1). 
24. Sachs testified that when the letter was drafted, he did not have "anything 
specifically in mind [and he] was trying to draw [Rothwell] out to come up with 
something" for a finder's fee. Sachs admits that the language in the letter regarding the 
finder's fee "it's not clear here" and that he didn't even know which United Park project 
the lots would be in. (R. 1277.) 
25. Sachs admits that Rothwell did not respond to the letter and the "specific 
amount of a finder's fee" was never discussed with Lesser, Rothwell or anyone affiliated 
with United Park. (R. 1213.) 
26. On May 18, 2001, Sachs sent another letter to Rothwell regarding Granite, 
which does not make any reference to a finder's fee. It states in its entirety as follows: 
I understand after a conversation yesterday with Joe Lesser, 
that his preference would be to sell the company rather than 
enter into a joint venture. I had referred to a joint venture in 
yesterday's letter because I had understood that you would 
consider such a proposition (and that is obviously what 
Granite seeks), and because a joint venture purchaser might 
also work for everyone. 
Happily, if you company's preference is sale, Granite, as I 
suggested in yesterday's letter, is still an excellent prospect. 
Another investor, together with Granite, would make an 
excellent purchaser. I am happy to re-direct my focus to 
obtaining such a joint venture purchaser. 
Obviously, I will continue to keep you apprised of all 
proposals, whether for sale or for a joint venturing of the 
project. 
(emphasis added) (R. 9; 1213-14;1278; 1284.) (Attached hereto as Addendum 2.) 
27. Rothwell did not respond to the May 18, 2001, letter. (R. 1214; 1277.) 
28. The agreement with Granite referenced in the May 17, 2001, letter and the 
May 18, 2001 letter never came to "fruition" because Granite did not enter into a joint 
venture with United Park or purchase United Park. (R. 1214.) 
29. On June 2, 2001, an article appeared in the Park Record entitled "Merger 
Rumblings Heard at UPCM." The article states United Park "was exploring strategies to 
raise money in order to fund the construction of Flagstaff Mountain Research and 
Bonanza Mountain Resort," including "a sale or exchange of [United Park's] capital 
stock, assets, projects or business to one or more parties . . . " (R. 1214; 1267.) 
30. Sachs testified that sometime before the "end of the first week in June" 
2001, he first contacted Jackson regarding United Park. (R. 1214; 1273.) 
31. When Sachs contacted Jackson, Jackson already knew that United Park was 
for sale through his discussions with Rothwell and the articles in the Park Record. The 
only "new" information Sachs relayed to Jackson was that Sachs had lunch with Lesser in 
early May 2001 and that the "sooner" United Park was sold, the "better." (R. 1198; 
1214-15; 1256; 2052.) 
32. On June 4, 2001, Sachs sent Jackson a facsimile coversheet regarding "JV 
Granite Const" requesting that Jackson call "after your talk with Hank Rothwell." (R. 10; 
1215; 1287.) (Attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
33. Sachs testified that he did not discuss a finder's fee with Jackson. Nor did 
Sachs inform Jackson that he considered Jackson to be his "client." (R. 530; 560.) 
34. Although Sachs was represented by counsel at this time, Sachs did not send 
United Park a letter or any other document indicating that he considered Jackson to be his 
"client" or that he expected to receive a finder's fee in the event of a transaction between 
Jackson and United Park. (R. 1974.) 
35. After June 4, 2001, Sachs called Jackson on several occasions to inquire 
about Jackson's negotiations with United Park. (R.9; 1120.) Jackson merely gave Sachs 
the courtesy of returning his calls. Jackson testified that "Sachs called . . . so many times 
that it was a nuisance [but I] was not going to share any information with him" because 
he was an "outsider" to the entire transaction. (R. 2056-57; 2138-39.) 
36. On or about February 21, 2002, Capital Growth "formally offered to 
purchase" United Park. (R. 11; 1215.) 
37. 0n February 23, 2002, the Salt Lake Tribune published an article regarding 
Capital Growth's purchase of United Park. (R. 1215; 1278; 1288.) 
38. The day after the article appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune, Sachs sent a fax 
to Rothweli regarding "completion of task." This was the first time Sachs notified United 
Park that he considered Jackson to be his "client." (R. 1215; 1279.) 
39. Between June 2001 and February 2002, Sachs testified that the "only" thing 
he did to find a purchaser for United Park was "make periodic telephone calls" to 
Jackson. (R. 1215; 1279.) 
40. Sachs never attended any meetings between United Park and Jackson, was 
never asked to sign a confidentiality agreement with United Park, and never participated 
in any negotiations with United Park. Sachs learned of Capital Growth's agreement to 
purchase United Park like the rest of the world, through a newspaper article. (R. 1977; 
2021-22.) 
41. On June 16, 2003, United Park and Capital Growth "completed a revised 
merger agreement whereby [United Park] became a wholly owned subsidiary of [Capital 
Growth]." (R. 14; 1215.) 
42. After the closing of the transaction, Sachs repeatedly "accosted" Jackson at 
restaurants in Park City to discuss his claim for a finder's fee. In an attempt to be polite 
and not cause a scene, Jackson responded to Sachs' statement that he had an 
"arrangement" with Lesser by stating "good for [you]." Jackson also told Sachs that 
"that's between you and Lesser" and that he personally "didn't mind" if Lesser paid him 
a fee. (R. 1978; 2023; 2060.) 
43. On August 19, 2003, Rothwell sent a facsimile to Sachs stating "Ira-United 
Park does not agree with your agency argument. Gerry [Jackson] and I have discussed 
UP [United Park] for years! We viewed you as a representative of Granite Construction 
only!" (R. 1452; 2062) (Attached hereto as Addendum 4). 
44. Sachs admits that did not forego any business opportunities by attempting 
to locate a purchaser for United Park. Indeed, Sachs testified that he spent no more than 
10 hours attempting to find a buyer for United Park. (R. 1216; 1275-76.) 
45, Sachs has never held a real estate license in Utah. His real estate license in 
New York lapsed "at least 15, 20 years ago." (R. 1216; 1263.) 
46. Sachs has never received a finder's fee for the sale of a company. (R. 1970; 
2005-07, 2045.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly ruled that Sachs' claims against United Park fail as a 
matter of law because there is no genuine dispute that: (1) the only asset of any 
significance of United Park was its real property; (2) the principal business of United 
Park was the leasing, development and sale of real property; (3) Sachs suggested 
compensation in the form of "a couple of prime developed lots" in United Park's new 
real estate project; and (4) Sachs never held a Utah real estate license. Consequently, the 
Utah Real Estate Broker's Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 -2-24, precludes Sachs from 
recovering compensation for allegedly finding a purchaser for United Park. 
The trial court also correctly ruled that Sachs' claims against United Park fail as a 
matter of law under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 -4-9. It is 
undisputed that United Park never signed any "writing" regarding the alleged finder's fee 
agreement that complies with the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds also bars 
Sachs' claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Although Sachs alleges that his 
"partial performance" removes the alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds, the 
"partial performance" exception is inapplicable in an action for the recovery of a finder's 
fee and, in any event, Sachs fails to satisfy the requirements of this exception. 
Finally, the trial court correctly dismissed Sachs' breach of contract claims 
because no enforceable express or implied finder's fee agreement was ever entered into 
between Sachs and United Park. United Park never agreed to pay Sachs a finder's fee 
and there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent on the "critical" terms of the 
alleged agreement, including the identity of Sachs' client and the amount of the finder's 
fee. Further, the undisputed material facts demonstrate that Sachs did not in fact "find" 
Jackson, who was already in negotiations with United Park when Sachs fist called him. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of United Park 
and this Court should affirm the Final Judgment.2 
ARGUMENT 
L SACHS HAS NOT APPEALED THE DISMISSAL OF HIS CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING AND/OR 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
In the Complaint, Sachs alleges five Counts against United Park: (a) Declaratory 
Judgment; (b) Breach of Contract; (c) Quantum Meruit - Contract Implied in Law; (d) 
Quantum Meruit - Contract Implied in Fact; and (e) Intentional Interference with 
Existing and/or Prospective Economic Relations. (R. 16-21.) The Final Judgment 
dismisses all Counts against United Park. (R. 2213-22.) Sachs does not challenge the 
trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of United Park on his intentional 
interference with existing and/or prospective economic relations claim. Consequently, 
this Court should affirm the dismissal of Count V of the Complaint. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE ARE 
2
 United Park also joins in the brief of Lesser and Loeb. 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF UNITED PARK. 
Sachs generally that there are "genuinely disputed issues of material fact that 
remain for trial" on all of his claims against United Park. Sachs fails to identify any such 
material facts, however. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment 
is not precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material fact is genuinely controverted." Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 
1391 (Utah 1978). A "genuine issue of fact" only exists "where, on the basis of the facts 
in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct measures up 
to the required standard." Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). When a 
moving party "challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, \ 31, 54 P.3d 1054. The nonmoving 
party must then present "evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the elements of the 
claim." Id. at f 35. This evidence must be "more than just conclusory assertions that an 
issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Id. at % 31. 
In this case, there are no genuine issues of material fact that relate to the United 
Park Motion. The trial court correctly applied the law to these undisputed material facts 
and this Court should affirm the Final Judgment. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT SACHS' 
CLAIMS FOR A FINDER'S FEE FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BECAUSE HE DOES NOT HAVE A VALID REAL ESTATE LICENSE AS 
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE BROKERS ACT. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Sachs' claims are barred because Utah law 
specifically precludes any person without a valid real estate license from recovering any 
compensation for facilitating real estate transactions or finding potential purchasers of 
real estate. It is undisputed that United Park's only asset of any significance was its real 
property. It is also undisputed that Sachs has never been properly licensed as a real estate 
broker or agent in Utah. Accordingly, Sachs' claims fail as a matter of law and this Court 
should affirm the Final Judgment. 
The Utah Real Estate Brokers Act ("UREBA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-1 -2- 24, 
specifically provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in 
the capacity of, advertise, or assume to act as a principal real estate broker, associate real 
estate broker, or a real estate sales agent within this state without a license obtained under 
this chapter." A "principal real estate broker" includes any person "who, with the 
expectation of receiving valuable consideration, assists or directs in the procurement of 
prospects for or the negotiation o f the sale or purchase of "real estate." Id. §61-2-
2(12)(d); see also Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., 584 P.2d 
848, 852 (Utah 1978) (holding that § 61-2-2 applies to finder's agreements); Andalex 
There is no de minimis exception to the real estate licensing provisions. "[0]ne act, for 
valuable consideration, of buying, selling, leasing, managing, or exchanging real estate 
for another, or of offering for another to buy, sell, lease, manage, or exchange real estate, 
requires the person performing, offering, or attempting to perform the act to be licensed 
as a principal real estate broker, an associate real estate broker, or a real estate sales agent 
as set forth in this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-17. 
Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah Ct App. 1994) ("The act of finding 
or locating a prospective buyer falls within the reach of the broker licensing statutes."). 
Further, section 61-2-18 provides: 
No person may bring or maintain an action in any court of 
this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or 
compensation for any act done or service rendered which is 
prohibited under this chapter to other than licensed principal 
brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a principal 
broker at the time of the doing of the act or rendering the 
service, 
"'Real estate5 includes leaseholds and business opportunities involving real 
estate." Id. at § 61-2-2(14). This expansive definition reflects the legislature's intention 
that the real estate licensing provisions be given broad application. Chade v. Morgan, 
339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1959) ("[T]he legislature saw fit to include within the 
definition of the term 'real estate' leaseholds and other interests less than leaseholds. 
This clearly indicates the intention of the legislature that a broad coverage be given to the 
term 'real estate' for the purposes of this Act."). 
In light of this clear prohibition, it is not surprising that there are no published 
Utah cases involving suit by an unlicensed person seeking to recover a commission under 
a purported finder's fee agreement relating to the sale of a business involving real estate 
opportunities. There are a number of cases from other jurisdictions, however, that have 
considered this issue. The majority of these cases have concluded that an unlicensed 
broker may not recover a commission or finder's fee relating to the sale or ownership 
transfer of a business involving a real estate component, regardless of how de minimus 
that component may be. See Chapin v. Neuhoff Broadcasting-Grand Island, 684 N.W.2d 
588, 593 (Neb. 2004) ("[T]he Act's licensure requirement for real estate brokers applies 
to transactions that involve any real estate or improvements thereon."); Blackthorne 
Group, Inc. v. Pines of Newmarket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725, 2004 WL 840281, *5 (N.H. 
2004) ("[T]he Act expressly defines 'real estate' to include 'business opportunities which 
involve any interest in real estate. The use of the word 'any' means that the Act applies 
regardless of whether real estate is 'incidental' to the transaction. The Act thus applies to 
the broker of business opportunities involving real estate, no matter how de minimis the 
real estate interest."); GDC Environmental services, Inc. v. Ransbottom Landfill, 740 
N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that it is "the majority rule that if a sale 
of a business involves any real estate component, no matter how de minimus, the 
unlicensed broker is denied recovery of any commission."); Lieffv. Medco Professional 
Services, 973 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that licensing statute 
precluded unlicensed plaintiff from recovering commission where sale of corporate stock 
resulted in transfer of a leasehold). 
A lesser number of courts have adopted a rule that an unlicensed person will not 
be precluded from potentially recovering a commission if the real estate component is 
"merely incidental" to the sale of the entire business, le., real estate was not a significant 
asset of the company or the motivating factor for the sale.4 GDC Environmental, 740 
N.E. 2d 1254, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting majority rule, but noting that a 
minority of "jurisdictions hold that an unlicensed broker is not precluded from recovering 
An extreme minority of courts have adopted the rule suggested by Sachs. 
a commission if the real estate component is 'merely incidental' to the sale of the entire 
business."); Thomas v. Daubs, 684 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (111. Ct. App. 1997) (adopting rule 
permitting "unlicensed broker to collect his fee only when the real estate is incidental to 
the transaction."); March Group, Inc. v. Bellar, 908 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Term. Ct. App. 
1995) ("Where the sale of a business involves only a transfer of stock, the real estate 
owned by the corporation should be viewed as incidental to the sale unless it is the 
business 'principal asset") (emphasis added). 
The trial court correctly ruled that Sachs' claims fail as a matter of law under 
application of either rule. There is no dispute that the "only asset of any significance" of 
United Park was its real property and that the principal business of United Park was the 
leasing, development and sale of real property. There is also no dispute that Sachs has 
never held a Utah real estate license.5 Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined 
that Sachs' claims are barred as a matter of law by Utah Code Ann. §§61-2-18. 
Sachs asserts four arguments challenging the trial court's decision. First, Sachs 
asserts that UREBA does not bar Sachs' claims because it is a "penal statute" that must 
be "strictly construed to avoid criminalizing conduct not clearly prohibited under its 
provisions." (Sachs Brief at 37.) Sachs next argues that "it was the stock of [United 
Park] that was sold, not its real property" and therefore UREBA does not apply. (Sachs 
Brief at 41.) Third, Sachs argues that his "offer to accept his finder's fee in the form of 
two prime developed lots" is irrelevant. (Sachs Brief at 43.) Finally, Sachs argues that 
UREBA is "not offended" because Rothwell and Lesser are themselves licensed real 
5
 Sachs formerly held a New York real estate license that expired 15-20 years ago. 
estate agents. (Sachs Brief at 44.)6 Sachs' arguments are without merit and the trial court 
correctly ruled that Sachs' finder's fee claims are barred by UREBA. 
A. UREBA is a Comprehensive Scheme Enacted to Regulate Real Estate Sales 
and Brokerage Practices and is Not a Penal Statute. 
Sachs' assertion that he should be excused from complying with UREBA because 
it is a "penal statute" is erroneous. Sachs completely ignores the fact that he has neither 
been charged with criminal violations of UREBA nor has any reasonable belief that he 
might be so prosecuted.7 Indeed, Sachs is not even a defendant in this action. Moreover, 
UREBA is not a penal statute, but rather a comprehensive scheme enacted to regulate the 
practice of real estate sales and brokerage practices. "[A] statute is not penal simply 
because its violation is a Class [A] misdemeanor." Evelyn v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 
130, 136 (Va. Ct. App. 2005). Rather, a court must examine the legislature's intended 
purpose in enacting the statute. As stated more fully by the United States Supreme Court: 
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has 
generally based its determination upon the purpose of the 
statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of 
punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter 
others, etc., it has been considered penal. But a statute has 
been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to 
punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate 
governmental purpose. The Court has recognized that any 
statute decreeing some adversity as a consequence of certain 
conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal effect. The 
controlling nature of such statutes normally depends on the 
Although Sachs also argues that "genuinely disputed issues of material fact also 
preclude summary judgment on these claims," Sachs fails to identify any disputed issues 
of fact that are material to the issue of whether UREBA bars his claim for a finder's fee. 
(Sachs Brief at 36.) 
Thus, there are no "due process" concerns such as those found in State v. Mooney, 2004 
UT 49, \ 17 (Criminal prosecution of defendant under Utah Controlled Substances Act). 
evident purpose of the legislature. 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1959). Accordingly, where a statute's primary purpose 
is regulatory or non-penal, the statute should be construed liberally, not narrowly as 
Sachs would suggest. See Evelyn, 621 S.E.2d at 137 ("the statute has a primarily 
regulatory, non-penal purpose and should be construed liberally in favor of the public 
interest rather than against it."); see also Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 770 P.2d 732, 
607, n.4 (Cal. 1989) ("If a statute's purpose is not to punish but to accomplish some other 
legitimate governmental purpose, then the statute is considered nonpenal. Hence, given 
the statute's purpose, like other statutes that provide for disciplinary action against 
licensees, the Contractors' State License Law is not penal in nature."). 
The Virginia Court of Appeals' decision in Evelyn is illustrious of this principle. 
In Evelyn, the Court was asked to consider the intent and effect of Virginia's statutory 
scheme regulating the use and ownership of riparian lands within the State. Id. at 133-
140. Pursuant to state statute, a riparian landowner was entitled to build a "pier" or 
"landing" upon his or her property without first obtaining a permit. Id. at 136. The 
statute provided, however, that a permit was required if the structure would encroach 
upon state owned "subaqueous riverbeds" unless such was "necessary" for placement of 
the "pier" or similar structure. Id. Construction of a "pier" (or similar structure) over 
state owned "beds of the bays, ocean, rivers, streams, or creeks" without a permit 
constituted a "Class 1 misdemeanor." Id. at 135. The pertinent statutes did not define 
relevant terms such as "pier" and "necessary." Id. at 136-37. Appellant constructed— 
without a permit—a pier that encroached upon state-owned "subaqueous riverbeds." Id. 
at 132. The pier had a roof and second story structure, which the Virginia permitting 
agency determined (after the pier was completed) was not necessary or essential to the 
pier. Id. 
Ultimately, the Virginia Court of Appeals agreed that the roof and second story 
structure was not "necessary" to the construction of the pier and ordered that it be 
removed by the appellant. Id. at 139. In so doing, the Court rejected appellant's 
argument that the undefined terms in the statutory scheme must be construed narrowly 
and in a fashion favorable to the appellant because the statutory scheme was purportedly 
"penal" in that it provided for criminal penalties. Id, at 136-37. The Court determined 
that the statute was not penal, but rather was a comprehensive regulatory scheme 
designed to protect rights of use and ownership of state owned lands. Id. As such, the 
Court determined that the terms in question should be construed liberally and in line with 
the understood intentions of the Virginia State Legislature. Id. at 137. 
UREBA, like the statute in Evelyn, is not penal because its primary purpose is not 
to punish, but rather to provide comprehensive regulations regarding issues of public 
concern. As indicated by a plain reading of UREBA, its principal intent is to protect the 
public by regulating real estate sales and brokerage practices. See Utah Code Ann. §61-
2-1 -2-24; Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Dev. Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 
1980) (stating that the provisions governing real estate sales were enacted for the 
"protection of members of the public who rely on licensed real estate brokers and 
salesmen to perform tasks that required a high degree of honesty and integrity. The 
licensing requirements and the provisions designed to enforce compliance therewith are 
designed to assure such honesty and integrity."); Blackthorne Group, Inc. v. Pines of 
Newmaket, Inc., 848 A.2d 725, 728 (N.H. 2004) (describing act strikingly similar to 
UREBA as "establishing a comprehensive system for regulating real estate sales and 
brokerage practices. It's purpose is to 'regulate the practice of real estate brokers and 
salespersons . . . to ensure that they meet and maintain minimum standards which 
promote public understanding and confidence in the business of real estate brokerage.5'). 
Accordingly, the provisions of UREBA are not primarily penal in nature and should be 
read liberally, not narrowly as urged by Sachs.8 
Moreover, contrary to Sachs' assertion, the definition of "real estate" is to be 
interpreted expansively for purposes of Utah's real estate licensing statutes. As clearly 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court, it was "the intention of the legislature that a broad 
coverage be given to the term 'real estate' for the purposes of this Act." Chade v. 
Morgan, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1959). As noted by the Court, the expansive scope 
of UREBA is readily evidenced by the legislature's defining "real estate" to include 
"interests less than leaseholds." Id. The legislature broadened the scope of UREBA even 
The provisions of UREBA are no more penal than are the myriad of other statutes 
contained in the Utah Code that regulate various occupations and professions. For 
example, the Utah Medical Practice Act sets forth over-arching regulations regarding the 
practice of medicine, including licensing requirements, board supervision and other 
matters. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-1 -67-803. Also included within the Utah Medical 
Practice Act is a provision for possible imposition of criminal penalties for violating 
certain portions of the Act. The inclusion of such penalty provisions within the overall 
regulatory scheme cannot reasonably be construed to mean that the Utah Medical 
Practice Act is a penal statute. 
further by defining "real estate" to specifically include "business opportunities involving 
real estate." See Utah Code. Ann. § 61-2-2(14).9 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that UREBA Applied Even Though 
the Real Estate was Transferred Via the Purchase of Corporate Stock. 
As demonstrated above, the vast majority of courts to have considered the issue 
9
 Sachs does not dispute that "business opportunities involving real estate" is included 
within the definition of "real estate" under UREBA. Rather, Sachs contends that because 
"business opportunities involving real estate" is not presently defined in the statute, it is 
necessarily vague and ambiguous and must be construed by the Court in a manner most 
favorable to him. Sachs' assertion is antithetical to the long standing rule of law that the 
courts are to give undefined terms their ordinary meaning as believed to be intended by 
the legislature. As recently stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative 
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve. We presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meant. Furthermore, we read the plain language of the statue as a 
whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters. 
State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, f 16 (internal citations omitted). 
Sachs also cites Andersen v. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725 (Utah 1945) for the proposition that 
"definitions of the terms 'real estate broker' and 'real estate5 [should not be extended] by 
implication." (Sachs Brief at 37.) In Andersen, the plaintiff assisted the defendant real 
estate broker in obtaining a listing for a farm. In return for this assistance, defendant 
agreed to pay him one-third of his commission once the farm was sold. Plaintiff did not 
list the farm, obtain a buyer for the farm, or otherwise participate in the sale of the farm. 
After the farm was sold, defendant refused to pay plaintiff one-third of his commission. 
Plaintiff sued and defendant defended on the grounds that his claim was barred by the 
statutory provisions regulating real estate brokers. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
statute "does not cover such an act." Id. at 728. In holding that it would be improper to 
"stretch" the meaning of the statute to include plaintiff, the Court likened plaintiffs 
assistance to the abstractor who prepared the abstract of the property or the stenographer 
who typed the contract of sale or the deed or the lease used in the transaction. Id. 729. 
As explained in the concurring opinion, such persons are not "active participants in any 
contract affecting real estate" and have only a "casual" or "remote" role in the 
transaction. Id. at 730. 
have determined that statutes such as UREBA strictly preclude an unlicensed person from 
seeking to recover compensation for brokering or finding potential buyers for businesses 
or corporations with significant real estate assets. This rule applies even if the sale 
merely contemplates the transfer of corporate stock. Everett v. Goodloe, 602 S.E.2d 284, 
289 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) ("The sale of all of the stock of the corporation was in legal 
effect a sale of all of its assets, and the mere fact that the parties found it more convenient 
to transfer ail of the stock rather than to make a conveyance of its assets does not change 
the substance of the transaction."); Lieff, supra, at 1278 ("We conclude that there is no 
requirement that real estate or a leasehold be transferred from one legal entity to another 
to trigger the licensure requirements. Rather, where, as here, the corporation whose 
entire stock is sold holds a leasehold that becomes the buyer's leasehold as a result of the 
sale, whether by transfer from the seller or otherwise, an indirect change in a leasehold 
interest, and therefore, the licensure requirements apply."); All Points Traders, Inc. v. 
Barrington Assoes., 259 Cal. Rptr 780, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting plaintiffs 
argument that "when a business is transferred through the purchase and sale of stock, 
rather than a purchase of assets and goodwill, the business opportunity licensing 
requirements do not apply.").l0 
10
 Sachs' contention that the statutes involved in the cases relied on by the trial court are 
drastically different from Utah's real estate licensing provisions is inaccurate. UREBA 
specifically provides that '"[r]eal estate' includes leaseholds and business opportunities 
involving real estate." Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). This provision is similar in 
substance to the statutes at issue in the cases cited by United Parks. See Chapin, supra, at 
593 (applying Nebraska Real Estate License Act, which does not expressly include 
businesses within scope of act); Blackthorne, supra, at 728 ("[T]he Act expressly defines 
'real estate' to include 'business opportunities which involve any interest in real estate."); 
i / i 
Whether the sale is for a corporation's real property or merely for all of the 
corporation's stock, the net effect is the same.11 Wisely, the legislature recognized this 
fact and determined that the scope of UREBA is to extend to "business opportunities 
involving real estate."12 The sale of a corporation whose sole significant asset is real 
estate and whose essential purpose is the development of such real estate falls squarely 
within the ambit of UREBA.13 
GDC Environmental supra, at 1258 ("Indiana's Licensing Act, unlike that of some 
states, does not expressly include the sale of a business within the statutory definition of 
broker activities that must be licensed."); Lieff, supra, at 1278 (statute requiring real 
estate license for anyone "negotiating or attempting or offering to negotiate the listing, 
sale, purchase, exchange, or lease of a business or business opportunity or the goodwill 
thereof or any interest therein when such act or transaction involves, directly or 
indirectly, any change in the ownership or interest in real estate, or in a leasehold interest 
or estate, or in a business or business opportunity which owns an interest in real estate or 
in a lease-hold."). March, supra, at 960 (applying Tennessee real estate licensing 
provisions, which do not expressly include businesses within scope of act). 
11
 Sachs cites two cases - Silvertooth v. Kelley, 91 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Or. 1939) and 
Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899 F.2d 1366 (3rd Cir. 1990) - for the proposition that 
brokerage of the stock of a corporation does not fall within real estate licensing 
provisions regardless of whether the corporation owns real property, significant or 
otherwise. (Sachs Brief at 40.) Silvertooth and Gruber did reach this conclusion. 
However, Silvertooth, which was decided in 1939 (and whose state statutes did not 
include "business opportunity" within the definition of "real estate"), and Gruber are in 
the extreme minority and Sachs does not assert otherwise. Further, a subsequent Third 
Circuit panel found the Gruber opinion to be largely erroneous and based upon faulty 
reasoning and interpretation of case law. Cooney v. Ritter, 939 F.2d 81, 86-88 (3rd Cir. 
1991). The Third Circuit in Cooney ultimately rejected the holding in Gruber and 
determined that, under New Jersey law, real estate licensing provisions did apply to the 
sale of corporate stock. Id at 88. As such, the Court determined that an unlicensed 
broker could only recover compensation on the purchase price of corporate stock that was 
attributable to the personal property of the corporation. Id. 
Sachs essentially concedes that his claims would be barred if United Park and Capital 
Growth had structured the transaction as an asset purchase. 
1 O 
In addition, there is no dispute that the potential purchasers allegedly contacted by 
Sachs - Bob Wells at Deer Valley, Granite and Jackson - are all real estate developers. 
C. UREBA Bars Sachs' Claims Regardless of Alleged "Sophistication" of 
Lesser, Loeb and United Park. 
Finally, Sachs' argument that the "purpose" of UREBA is not offended by 
enforcing the alleged oral finder's fee agreement is unavailing. (Sachs Brief at 43-44.) 
This argument completely ignores the fact that this Court has specifically rejected the 
argument that "the presumed purpose" of UREBA means that "sophisticated" parties are 
not entitled to the protections of the statute. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 
1041, 1045 (Utah Ct App. 1994). In Andalex, this Court specifically stated: 
We disagree with Myers' premise that the presumed purpose 
of a statute overrides its literal terms. *** Even if we accept 
the argument that the purpose of the statute overrides the 
statute's unambiguous language, the services provided by 
Myers still fall within the purpose of the licensing statutes. 
The legislature clearly intended the licensing requirements to 
apply to "finders." Further, nothing suggests that 
"sophisticated" corporate entities such as Andalex should not 
be entitled to the same protections as the general public under 
the statute. 
Id. at 1045 & n.6 (internal citations omitted).14 
United Park is folly entitled to invoke the protections of UREBA and the trial 
court correctly ruled that Sachs' claims are barred by UREBA. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT SACHS5 
CLAIM FOR A FINDER'S FEE BASED ON AN ALLEGED ORAL 
AGREEMENT IS BARRED BY THE UTAH STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The trial court also correctly determined that Sachs' claims fail as a matter of law 
because the alleged oral finder's fee agreement is barred by the Utah Statute of Frauds, 
14
 The only cases cited by Sachs in support of this argument are mechanic's lien cases. 
These cases are simply not applicable. 
which is intended to protect parties such as United Park from "fraudulent and fictitious 
claims for commission" by parties such as Sachs. See Machan Hampshire Properties, 
Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The 
Utah Statute of Fraud provides: 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4.15 This provision applies with equal force to purported 
"finder's agreements." Machan, 779 P.2d at 234 (The Statute of Frauds "applies broadly 
to agreements requiring compensation for brokering real estate, including finder's 
agreements, and not just to contracts employing brokers to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation."); CJ. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 927 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that the Statute of Frauds "applies to the commission agreements of real estate 
As noted in Section III, supra, under Utah law, "'real estate' includes leaseholds and 
business opportunities involving real estate." See Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(14). Statutes 
are considered to be in pari materia and must be construed together when they relate to 
the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose 
or object. JJ.W. v. State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 33 P.3d 59, 63 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2001). When considering statutes related to the same subject matter, courts will 
attempt to construe them in harmony such that effect is given to every provision in all of 
them. I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038, 1047 (Utah 2002). Moreover, "where two statutes 
treat the same subject matter, and one statute is general while the other is specific, the 
specific provision controls." Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc, 173 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Accordingly, "real estate," for purposes of the Utah Statute of Frauds, 
should be defined the same as under UREBA. 
brokers generally and not just to contracts employing brokers to 'purchase or sell real 
estate for compensation.'"). 
To comply with the Statute of Frauds, a finder's fee agreement "must contain all 
the essential terms and provisions of the contract to which the parties have agreed." 
Machan, 779 P.2d at 234. These "critical terms" include: the identity of the finder; the 
finder's clients; the property owner who will owe a commission to the finder if a 
transaction is closed; and the commission rate. C.J. Realty, 758 P.2d at 928. Further, the 
"writings must so clearly evidence the fact that a contract was made, and what its terms 
are, 'that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of the contract is false.'" 
Machan, 779 P.2d at 235 (quoting 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §512 at 547 
(1950)). Based on the undisputed material facts, the trial court correctly held that Sachs' 
alleged oral finder's fee agreement is an agreement relating to the purchase or sale of real 
estate that does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. 
In his brief, Sachs first argues that the trial court erroneously characterized his 
alleged oral finder's fee agreement as "relat[ing] to the purchase or sale of real estate." 
Sachs argues that the alleged agreement "relates to finding a buyer for [United Park], the 
corporation, rather than finding a buyer for the real estate assets of [United Park]." 
(Sachs Brief at 46.) As established in Section III, supra, the alleged agreement "relates to 
the purchase or sale of real estate" because United Park's "only asset of any significance" 
was its real property and the principal business of United Park was the leasing, 
development and sale of real property. Indeed, Sachs introduced Granite as a "potential 
land development partner" that is capable of doing the "development infrastructure" for 
United Park's real estate and thereby creating with United Park "one of the nation's 
premier skiing and real estate developments." Sachs also suggested that his 
compensation be in the form of "couple of prime developed lots in the new project." Id 
The fact that the transaction was ultimately structured as a "stock purchase" rather than 
an "asset purchase" does not change the nature of the transaction.16 Indeed, Capital 
Growth purchased United Park in order to develop the real estate owned by United Park 
and Sachs' arguments regarding the "form" of the transaction is nothing more than an 
attempt to elevate form over substance. Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded 
that Sachs' alleged oral finders' fee agreement is subject to the Statute of Frauds. 
The trial court also correctly held that Sachs' alleged agreement fails to comply 
with the Statute of Frauds. Sachs admits that the alleged agreement was oral, not written, 
which by itself, is fatal to his claims. Sachs' alleged agreement also does not set out the 
"the critical terms" necessary for a finding of an enforceable finder's fee agreement, 
including the identity of his alleged "client" or the "commission" rate. The only person 
or entity referred to in any written correspondence between Sachs and United Park is 
Granite. Sachs has not identified one writing, much less a writing signed by United Park, 
that mentions Jackson or a potential transaction between United Park and Jackson. 
Applying this Court's holding in Machan, these letters do not "evidence the purported 
agreement vis a vis [Jackson] that [Sachs] seeks to enforce." See Machan, 779 P.2d at 
236. Indeed, "it is elementary that compliance with the statute of frauds cannot be 
16
 Sachs has submitted no evidence that he had any idea what the form of the transaction 
would be at the time he introduced Granite to United Park. 
effected by producing a writing of some contract different from the contract on which the 
party is basing his claim." Id. Thus, Sachs has failed to demonstrate his compliance with 
the Statute of Frauds with respect to Jackson, regardless of the "sufficiency" of Sachs' 
"hypothetical lawsuit to enforcement payment of a [finder's fee] upon the sale of [United 
Park] to [Granite Construction]." Id. at 235-6. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
determined that the May 17, 2001, and May 18, 2001, letters, alone or combined, do not 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds.17 
Lastly, Sachs argues that he falls under the "partial performance" exception to the 
Statute of Frauds. (Sachs Brief at 48.) The trial court, however, correctly rejected this 
argument because Utah courts have long held that such exception does not apply in the 
context of claims for commissions relating to real property transactions. See Case v. 
Ralph, 188 P. 640, 642 (Utah 1921) (holding that "a real estate broker or agent cannot 
recover commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchase for 
real property unless . . . there is an express contract" and that "performance or part 
performance of a parol agreement is unavailing"). 
Even if this exception is applicable to Sachs' alleged agreement, the undisputed 
material facts show that Sachs has not satisfied the requirements of this exception. To 
remove the alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds, Sachs must prove by "strong 
evidence" that (1) the oral agreement and its terms are clear and definite; (2) the acts 
17
 Sachs does not dispute that under Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876, 877 (Utah 1953), 
his assertion of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims cannot save his claims for 
breach of an oral finders' fee agreement if such agreement is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds. (Sachs Brief at 47.) 
done in performance of the oral agreement are equally clear and definite; and (3) the acts 
are in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not 
have been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the 
part of United Park would result in fraud on Sachs. See Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 
% 22; see also Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983) (The critical observation 
to make in assessing what constitutes sufficient part performance is that it must be proved 
by strong evidence). The doctrine of "partial performance" must be applied with "great 
care" and the acts allegedly taken must be "substantial." Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 
713, 715 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998). 
Sachs fails the first requirement because it is undisputed that Sachs never 
discussed a finder's fee with anyone at United Park. The only alleged basis for the oral 
finder's fee agreement is the May 17, 2001, letter from Sachs to United Park. A cursory 
reading of this letter shows that there are no "clear and definite" terms. Granite is the 
only potential "client" referred to in the letter. Jackson is not mentioned anywhere in the 
letter. Nor has Sachs submitted any writing that refers to Jackson, much less Jackson as 
his client, or a potential transaction between Jackson and United Park. The proposed 
"finder's fee" set forth in the May 17, 2001, is vague and ambiguous. Sachs suggests a 
"modest fee" in the form of "cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or 
some other consideration acceptable to both of us." No reasonable jury could construe 
phrases such as "modest fee" and "consideration acceptable to both of us" as "clear and 
definite" terms regarding the amount of the finder's fee. 
Sachs also fails the second requirement because he has not provided any evidence 
of "clear and definite acts" done in the performance of the alleged agreement that relate 
exclusively to Jackson. All of the acts allegedly performed by Sachs - corresponding 
with United Park and calling Jackson and Granite - were done in connection with 
Granite's interest in United Park.18 Thus, Sachs has failed to show any acts that are 
"exclusively referable" to the alleged agreement for Jackson. See Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. 
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975) (holding that "such acts as are relied on must be 
exclusively referable to the contract."); In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
1954) ("[T]he equitable doctrine of part performance is based on estoppel and unless the 
acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the contract there is nothing to show 
that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his position to his prejudice, so as to give rise to 
an estoppel."). 
For these same reasons, Sachs fails the third requirement of demonstrating that 
these acts were done in reliance on the alleged agreement regarding Jackson. The only 
"evidence" cited by Sachs is his self-serving testimony that "he worked a [sic] fee basis, 
and that a fee for finding a buyer for a corporation is usual and customary." (Sachs Brief 
at 49.)19 It is undisputed that Sachs did not forgo any other business opportunities to 
pursue a purchaser for United Park. Sachs spent "less than 10 hours" on pursuing a 
18
 The other acts alleged by Sachs - "discussing the finder's fee with Jackson and 
requesting payment of his finder's fee after Jackson bought [United Park] - were done 
after Capital Growth purchased United Park and thus can not be considered acts in 
furtherance of his alleged oral finder's fee agreement. (Sachs' Brief at 49.) 
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 Sachs has no basis for making this statement. It is undisputed that he has never 
received a fee for the sale of a company before. 
purchaser for United Park, including the time he spent on Granite. Although Sachs 
argues that he would have found another purchaser to "outbid" Jackson, he fails to 
identify one such purchaser. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected Sachs' partial 
performance argument and the Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of United Park on the grounds that the alleged agreement is barred by 
the Statute of Frauds. 
V. SACHS CLAIMS FAIL BECAUSE THERE IS NO ENFORCEABLE ORAL 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN SACHS AND UNITED PARK. 
The trial court also correctly ruled that Sachs' declaratory judgment and breach of 
contract claims (Counts I and II) fail as a matter of law. It is Minute Entry Decision, the 
trial court held: 
The undisputed material facts demonstrate that no enforceable 
express or implied finder's fee agreement was ever entered 
into. In this Court's view, no reasonable minds could differ 
that there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent on 
material terms of the alleged finder's fee agreement, that 
there is a lack of definiteness and material terms such as 
price, and no reasonable method to calculate price, 
manifesting an intent of the parties to be bound thereby, and 
that any finder's fee agreement was subject to further 
negotiation. 
Sachs argues that the trial court erred because the May 17, 2001, letter formed an 
"express" finder's fee contract and included the "points of mutual agreement necessary to 
Although Sachs argues that "this evidence is sufficient to raise a jury question on the 
issue of whether [his] performance is sufficient to take his finder's fee agreement outside 
the Statute of Frauds," this "evidence" simply cannot be interpreted to satisfy the 
elements of the [exception]." See Shaw Resources Limited v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, 
P.C., 2006 UT App 313, f 22 (stating that the trial court "must consider each element of 
the claim under the appropriate standard of proof' on a motion for summary judgment). 
create a valid finder's fee contract [which are] (1) the identity of the finder; (2) the thing 
or person to be found; and (3) the fee to be paid to the finder." (Sachs' Brief at 26.) 
Sachs then argues that even though United Park never responded to this letter, United 
Park's "assent" was nevertheless "supplied by Lesser's request to Plaintiff Sachs to find a 
purchaser for [United Park] after receiving notice of the fee Plaintiff Sachs expected for 
his services." As discussed further below, the trial court correctly determined that there 
was no enforceable express or implied contract between United Park and Sachs. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that There Was No Express or 
Implied Contract Between United Park and Sachs Because There Was No 
Assent or Acceptance by United Park. 
Sachs admits that he never discussed a finder's fee with United Park and that 
United Park never told him it would pay him a finder's fee. Sachs, however, argues that 
an express contract was formed when United Park did not respond to the May 17, 2001, 
or otherwise specifically tell him it would not pay a finder's fee in connection with a 
transaction between Jackson and United Park. (Sachs Brief at 26.) This argument is 
fatally defective as a matter of law. As the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
A binding contract can exist only where there has been 
mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be 
bound by its terms. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962). See also Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 
575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978) ("Contractual mutual assent requires assent by all 
parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms."). 
In this case, it is undisputed that United Park never told Sachs it would pay him a finder's 
fee if he found a purchaser for United Park. Nor did United Park respond to the May 17, 
2001, letter or May 18, 2001, letter. Moreover, Sachs alleged conversation with Jackson 
about United Park occurred weeks after he sent these letters to United Park. Thus, there 
was no reason for United Park to respond to the May 17, 2001, letter, which refers to 
Granite only, by specifically telling Sachs that it would not pay him the finder's fee if 
Jackson purchased United Park. Under these circumstances and contrary to Sachs' 
assertion, United Park's silence did not constitute acceptance. Instead, by not responding 
to the letter, United Park rejected Sachs' "offer" of a finder's fee. See McGurn v. Bell 
Microproducts, Inc., 284 F.3d 86, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) ("As a general rule, silence in 
response to an offer to enter into a contract does not constitute an acceptance of the 
offer."); 1 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 3.19 (West 1993) ("It should be 
plainly set forth than an offeror has no power to cause the silence of the offeree to operate 
as an acceptance when the offeree does not intend it to do so."); see also Cal Wadsworth 
Const v. City of St George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995) ("An acceptance must 
unconditionally assent to all material terms presented in the offer, including price and 
method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer."). 
The only legal authority cited by Sachs in support of his "silence is acceptance" 
argument are the Missouri cases of Central Missouri Prof Svcs. v. Shoemaker, 108 
S.W.3d 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) and Moore v. Kuehn, 602 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Mo. App. 
1980). The facts in these cases are not even remotely similar to the undisputed facts in 
these cases. In Shoemaker, the plaintiff submitted a written proposal for engineering 
services to the defendant. The defendant instructed the plaintiff to proceed with the 
work, which it did. The Missouri court addressed the issue of whether the defendant's 
"verbal acceptance" of the proposal created an oral contract binding on the defendant. 
The defendant accepted the invoices from plaintiff but later refused to pay them. The 
Missouri court concluded that there was a binding contract because "it is a well settled 
rule of law that a written offer may be orally accepted." Id. at 9. In Moore, plaintiff 
prepared a proposal to repair defendant's roof. After receiving the proposal, defendant 
told plaintiff that "the roof ought to be fixed, so get on it." Id. at 718. In contrast, Sachs 
admits that United Park never responded to his May 17, 2001, letter and that this letter 
refers to Granite, not Jackson. Thus, there was no oral acceptance of Sachs' proposal. 
Indeed, Sachs admits that he never discussed a finder's fee with United Park in 
connection with Jackson's potential purchase of United Park and that the first time he 
informed United Park that he expected a finder's fee in connection with Jackson was in 
February 2002, after Capital Growth formally offered to purchase United Park and this 
offer was publicly reported in the Park Record. Thus, any alleged "acceptance" of the 
"offer" in the May 17, 2001, letter by virtue of United Park's "silence" necessarily 
referred to Granite only. 
Further, Sachs concedes that the "critical terms" of a finder's fee agreement 
includes "the finder's clients." See C.J. Realty, 758 P.2d at 928. Again, the only "client" 
identified in the May 17, 2001, and May 18, 2001, letters, which were drafted by Sachs' 
legal counsel, is Granite. And, despite the fact that Sachs was represented by legal 
counsel when he allegedly spoke with Jackson in early June 2001, Sachs did not send a 
similar letter to United Park identifying Jackson as his "client" or requesting a finder's 
fee in the event that a transaction between Jackson and United Park came to "fruition." 
Thus, even if an express finder's fee agreement did exist by virtue of the May 17, 2001, 
letter, it was limited to Granite and did not encompass Jackson or Capital Growth. See 
Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Dev. Co., 779 P.2d 230, 
234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("It is elementary that compliance with the Statute of Frauds 
cannot be effected by producing a writing of some contract different from the contract on 
which the party is basing his claim."). 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that There Was No Express or 
Implied Contract Between United Park and Sachs Because There Was 
Meeting of the Minds on the Material Terms of a Finder's Fee Agreement. 
The trial court also correctly determined that there was no meeting of the minds or 
mutual assent on the material terms of the alleged oral finder's fee agreement and that 
there is a lack of definiteness with respect to price and no reasonable method to calculate 
price. In Utah, a contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the 
parties are set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed. Bunnell at 600. 
A "meeting of the minds is essential to the formation of any contract and this meeting of 
the minds must be spelled out, either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient detail to be 
enforced. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 294 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427,428 (Utah 1961)). An "agreement to agree" 
is "unenforceable because [it] leaves open material terms for future consideration, and the 
courts cannot create these terms for the parties." Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 
(Utah 1979). The "legal consequence of a missing price term is the unenforceability of 
the agreement.55 Carter v. Sorensen, 2004 UT 33, \\\}1 Agreements that lack material 
terms, particularly financial terms, are incapable of being enforced by the courts because 
"[c]ourts are simply not equipped to make monetary decisions impacted by the 
fluctuating commercial world and are even less prepared to impose paternalistic 
agreements on litigants.55 Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988). 
Assuming that United Park's silence constituted "acceptance55 of Sachs5 offer to 
find a joint venture partner or purchaser for United Park, and assuming further that 
Sachs5 offer somehow included Jackson even though he is not mentioned in the offer, the 
letter vaguely proposes "cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or 
some other consideration acceptable to both of us55 as the "fee55 for finding a joint venture 
partner or purchaser for United Park. This language clearly demonstrates that any such 
fee would be subject to further negotiation between Sachs and United Park. Indeed, 
Sachs admits that when he drafted the letter with the assistance of his counsel at Prince 
Yeates, he did not have "anything specifically in mind [and he] was trying to draw 
[Rothwell] out to come up with something.55 Under these circumstances, the trial court 
correctly determined that there was no binding contract between United Park and Sachs 
that it could or should enforce. See Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 
1985); Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) 
21
 Sachs argues that Carter is distinguishable. (Sachs Brief at 30). In Carter, it would 
have been theoretically possible to value the water rights using a fair market value 
analysis. The point is that there was no evidence, extrinsic or otherwise, that the parties 
intended the purchase price of the water rights to be their fair market value. Carter, 
supra, at ^ f 11. 
ao 
("If the parties intend to negotiate further terms of an agreement, a manifestation of 
willingness to enter into the agreement is only preliminary, and does not demonstrate the 
existence of a binding contract"). 
In his brief, however, Sachs argues that there was a "meeting of the minds on the 
amount of the finder's fee" because the "couple of prime developed lots in the new 
project" had a value of approximately $2 million and that such amount "was an 
appropriate finder's fee based on his experience, the expedited manner in which he found 
a buyer and the size of the deal." (Sachs' Brief at 26 and 28.) Sachs misunderstands 
Utah law and the trial court's ruling. The issue is not whether it is theoretically possible 
to place a value on the "prime developed lots" in United Park's real estate development 
project. The issue is whether there was a "meeting of the minds" by United Park and 
Sachs on material terms such as the amount of the finder's fee. A simple review of the 
May 17, 2001, letter, coupled with United Park's lack of response to the letter and Sachs' 
admission that he was simply trying to "draw Rothwell out" by sending the letter, 
establishes that there was no such meeting of the minds as a matter of law. The letter 
states, in relevant part: 
I write this letter to remind you that I will expect a modest 
finder's fee if an agreement comes to fruition. This could be 
cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or 
some other consideration acceptable to both of us. While I 
believe we have an understanding as to this finder's fee, I do 
think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the table 
early on, and I hope that you feel the same. 
(emphasis added). 
Importantly, the May 17, 2001, letter states that amount of the finder's fee would 
have to "acceptable to both of us." This language clearly indicates that Sachs anticipated 
that the amount of the finder's fee would need to be further negotiated between the 
parties. As such, the May 17, 2001, letter "is too indefinite and uncertain for 
enforcement. " See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373-4 (Utah 
1996). Nor does the May 17, 2001, letter state a method for determining a finder's fee. It 
simply suggests a "modest finder's fee," which is impliedly different from a "reasonable 
finder's fee."22 It suggests "cash or a couple of prime developed lots in the new project." 
It does not suggest that a "cash" fee would need to equal the value of such lots. 
Moreover, contrary to Sachs' suggestion, there is no "extrinsic evidence" for the 
jury to consider regarding the amount of the finder's fee. (Sachs' Brief at 29.) Sachs 
admits that he had NO discussions with Lesser, Loeb or United Park about the finder's 
fee. The only "communication" between Sachs and United Park (or Lesser and Loeb) 
regarding the finder's fee is the May 17, 2001. The May 17, 2001, letter does not refer to 
a "reasonable" or "customary" finder's fee. Thus, there is no basis for extrinsic evidence 
regarding a "reasonable" or "customary fee." Nor is Sachs' self-serving testimony that 
3% of the purchase price of United Park is "an appropriate finder's fee based on his 
experience, the expedited manner in which he found a buyer and the size of the deal" 
admissible extrinsic evidence because it does not help "delineate the intent" of United 
Park or Sachs. See Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980) ("In reviewing the 
The payment of $2 million for a mere 10 hours of "work" is certainly not "modest." 
written agreement evidencing the contract, and any ambiguity inherent in the language 
used, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the court to delineate the intent of the 
parties")- Sachs has not offered any such extrinsic evidence that would be admissible to 
show United Park's intent regarding the amount of the finder's fee. 
Finally, Sachs' argument that the "price term" is "incidental to the agreement" is 
completely without merit. (Sachs Brief at 30.) The "finder's fee" is the "major aspect" 
of the alleged agreement. It is certainly not an "incidental detail." In Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the failure of the parties to agreement on the "rental rate" for the renewal term 
of the lease rendered the renewal option unenforceable. Id at 364. In Brown's Shoe Fit 
Co. v. Olch, this Court held that the lack of a "price term in the option period" made a 
letter outlining the lease terms "too vague and indefinite" to be unenforceable. 955 P.2d 
357, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).23 Based on these undisputed facts and Utah law, the trial 
court correctly ruled that Sachs' breach of contract claims fail as a matter of law. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that There Was No Implied Contract 
Between United Park and Sachs. 
In his brief, Sachs argues that even if he "is not entitled to recover under an 
'express' contract theory, genuinely disputed issues of material fact preclude summary 
In contrast, in Reed v. Alvey, supra, the purchase price of the property was specified 
in the written agreement. Although the written description of the real property was 
"concededly vague and incomplete on its face, i.e., corner of Hillview and Ninth East," 
the Utah Supreme Court held that "everyone connected with the deal knew what land was 
involved" and therefore this ambiguity did not render the written agreement 
unenforceable. Nor did the lack of payment terms, 610 P.2d at 1377. 
judgment on [his] claims for breach of an implied contract..." (Sachs Brief at 31.)24 As 
discussed above, Sachs' "unjust enrichment" claims are barred by UREBA and the 
Statute of Frauds. Even assuming that they are not, the trial court correctly determined 
that Sachs' unjust enrichment claims fail as a matter of law. 
Quantum merit has two distinct branches: contract implied in law or "quasi-
contract" and contract implied in fact Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). In order to prevail on a contract implied in law claim against United 
Park, Sachs must prove that (a) he conferred a benefit on United Park; (b) United Park 
had an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; (c) under such circumstances as to make 
it inequitable for United Park to retain the benefits without payment of its value. 
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 
(Utah 1996). There must be some misleading act, request for services, or the like by 
United Park to support such an action. See Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. 
Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977). In order to establish a contract implied in fact, Sachs 
must establish that: (a) United Park requested that he perform the work; (b) Sachs 
expected United Park to compensate him for the services; and (c) United Park knew or 
should have known that he expected compensation. Dixie Six Corp, 753 P.2d. at 975. 
The undisputed facts, however, clearly demonstrate that Sachs does not satisfy 
these requirements as a matter of law. With respect to an alleged "contract implied in 
law," it is undisputed that Sachs did not confer a benefit on United Park. Sachs admits 
Again, Sachs fails to identify any material facts that are in dispute. 
that at the time of his initial telephone conversation to Jackson, the fact that United Park 
was "for sale" had been public information for several months. Sachs does not dispute 
that Jackson was already pursuing a possible purchase of United Park as a result of his 
discussions with Roth well in late December 2000 or early January 2001, six months 
before Sachs' telephone call. Sachs further admits that he provided no other "assistance" 
to either United Park or Jackson. He did not attend meetings, participate in due diligence 
o r 
or negotiate the terms and condition of the purchase. Indeed, he was never asked to 
sign a confidentiality agreement and did not leam of the execution of the agreement 
between Capital Growth and United Park until he read about it in the newspaper like the 
rest of the world. Thus, the sum total of the alleged "benefit" conferred on United Park is 
one telephone call that lasted less than 5 minutes in which already public information was 
conveyed to Jackson. This was certainly not a "benefit" to United Park, much less a 
benefit entitling Sachs to receive over $2 million in a "finder's fee." 
Further, the undisputed facts show that Sachs fails to satisfy the remaining 
elements of a breach of implied in law contract claim, namely, that United Park had "an 
"appreciation" of this alleged benefit under 'circumstances as to make it inequitable' for 
United Park to retain this alleged benefit without payment of its value." See American 
Towers Owners at 1190. Sachs' only "evidence" of an alleged "appreciation" is the May 
17, 2001. (Sachs' Brief at 33). This letter, of course, does not refer to Jackson at all. 
Sachs also submitted no evidence that it would be unjust for United Park to "retain the 
25
 Indeed, Sachs testified that from May 2001 to July 2003, he spent "no more than 10 
hours" allegedly finding a purchaser for United Park. 
benefit." Sachs simply states that Capital Growth purchased United Park for 
approximately $67 million. (Id). Given that it was public knowledge that United Park 
was for sale and that Jackson was already in negotiations with United Park, Sachs fails to 
show how his 5 minute telephone call to Jackson in June 2001 was the "procuring cause" 
of this transaction. With these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly determined that 
Sachs' contract implied in law claim failed as a matter of law. 
With respect to his implied in fact contract claim, Sachs concedes that United Park 
never told him that if he found a buyer for United Park, he would be paid a finder's fee. 
Thus, he fails to satisfy the first element of an implied in fact contract Nevertheless, 
Sachs argues that United Park's non-response to his May 17, 2001 letter created an 
"implied finder's fee contract" between Sachs and United Park. (Sachs Brief at 34). In 
support of this argument, Sachs cites the Arizona case of Turnkey Corp. v. Rappeport, 
720 P.2d 115 (Ariz. App. 1986). This case is easily distinguishable. In Turnkey, the 
plaintiff was a general contractor. Id. at 116. Before the job that was the subject of the 
lawsuit, the plaintiff had done at least three jobs for the defendant, all on a "cost plus 
10% overhead plus 10% profit basis plus sales tax." Id. The plaintiff argued that the 
current job was also done on this same basis. Id. at 117. The defendant, having paid the 
first three invoices for this last job, refused to pay the final invoice arguing that he set a 
"top limit on the total expenditure." Id. The defendant never denied asking the plaintiff 
to perform the work. Id. Under these facts, the Arizona court held that there was an 
implied contract between the parties. Id. at 118. 
Here, United Park did not ask Sachs to perform any services and, more 
importantly, there is no "course of dealing" in similar transactions that would 
demonstrate that the "relations" between United Park and Sachs have been such to create 
a "duty" on the part of United Park to either accept or reject Sachs' proposal. Thus, 
United Park's "silence" with respect to his alleged offer was not "acceptance" of his 
alleged offer. And, for the reasons set forth above, there is simply no evidence that a 
reasonable jury could believe that would prove that United Park knew or should have 
known that Sachs expected to be paid a finder's fee in connection with Jackson's 
purchase of United Park. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that Sachs' claims 
for implied contract fail as a matter of law. 
D. Sachs' Claims Also Fail as a Matter of Law Because the Undisputed Facts 
Show that Sachs Did Not "Find" Jackson as a Buyer for United Park. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that an enforceable contract exists, the 
undisputed facts demonstrate that Sachs did not "find" Jackson as a purchaser for United 
Park. It is undisputed that Jackson and Rothwell were discussing a possible purchase of 
United Park approximately six months before Sachs' telephone call to Jackson. Sachs 
admits that the fact that United Park was "for sale" was public information in late January 
2001 or early February 2001. Sachs, however, continues to argue that he "found" 
Jackson because no one told him of the discussions between Jackson and Rothwell. 
Ignoring that United Park had no duty to inform Sachs of these negotiations, there are 
several obvious flaws with Sachs' argument. First, as Lesser testified, Sachs was a "total 
stranger" and therefore he would not have discussed such matters with him. Sachs also 
admits that he never asked United Park if it was negotiating with other parties and that he 
never mentioned any potential purchasers to Lesser or United Park other than Granite. 
United Park certainly had no reason to volunteer this information to Sachs. Second, as 
Jackson testified, United Park was a public company and therefore he was under explicit 
instructions not to discuss his negotiations with anyone. Third, Rothwell viewed Sachs 
as a representative of Granite only and therefore would have no reason to mention United 
Park's negotiations with Jackson. And finally, Sachs never sent United Park any type of 
written document regarding Jackson prior to Capital Growth's offer to purchase United 
Park in February 2002. Based on these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly held that 
no reasonable minds could differ that Sachs did not "find" Jackson as a purchaser for 
United Park. 
CONCLUSION 
Sachs' claims are barred by the Utah Real Estate Brokers Act and the Utah Statute 
of Frauds. Even if Sachs' claims were not barred, these claims nevertheless fail as a 
matter of law because no enforceable agreement was entered into between United Park 
and Sachs. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Final Judgment. 
DATED this of September, 2006. 
LAURA S. SCOTT 
SHANE D.HILLMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
United Park City Mines Company and 
Capital Growth LLC 
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May 17, 2001 
Mr. H:mfc Roihwclt 
Untied Park City Mines 
P.O. Box 1450 
Patk City, UT 
Dear Hank, 
I am delighted that my introducing United Park City Mines to Granite Land Company 
appears to be heading in the right direction and I am pleased that the confidentiality letter has been 
sieucd. I certainly will coutiauc to do everything in iny power to bring together a mutually 
satisfactory agreement between these two parlies, I took the opportunity to express this commitment 
to your chairman, Joe Lessor, when he invited me to lunch at the Sky8 Room in New York in early 
May. 
1 perceive this venture as joining two entities with the potential of creating one of the nation's 
premier skiing and real estate developments. In other words, I think that both parties are in the right 
place a: the right lime. 1 hope you agree. 
IfUh^Vj^ BQljwiih Joe Lessor, I was delighted to find that he seems to share our enthusiasm 
for Ihi^inl venctug) I hope that this feeling is generally shared by the rest of your board. Most 
potcnliaj^ JV" hncl development partners would still require a Granite Construction to do the 
development infrastructure. This JV partner comes with that capability. Joe gave mc his 
encouragement to 4<gct the job done.11' 
1 write this letter to remind you that t will expect a modest finder's fee if an agreement comes 
to fruition. This could be cash, a couple of prime developed lots in the new project, or some other 
cohsidcralion acceptable to both of us. While I believe that we have an understanding as to this 
Adder's fee, 1 do think that matters of this sort ought to be out on the table early on, and I hope that 
y<ju feel the same. 
Please let mc know if you have any questions about such a finder's fee. 
I look fonvmd to continuing our quest to link these two parties for everyone's benefit, 
including the shareholders who overwhelming expressed their approval. 
Very truly yours, 
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MaylS.2001. 
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y, 
Mr Ha:* Rothweli 
Unilcul^rkCUyMi^5 
P. O. Box 145<7 
Par'xCiiy.t-'T 
D C a
'
; H a n k
' • , .^h Joe Lessor, that his preference w u U be 
, understand, after a conversion yesterday**hjtoe U s . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
• , r™ito as I su^eswi in yesterday's Met. 
•omt venturing ofihc project 
Ve/v| truly youvs. 
IS'rp 
EXHIBIT 
ft 
S^-acte 
COO 1 6 
Tab 3 
IRA SACHS Sc CO 
/K::,„*>-*7 
103031. Poem*. MUKOW, yji.nrrpo***. A-U. cTpt 
T«. . <(»6) 20C-444*. 2004440; <»»c: (OW) 200-4400, 2504340 
Stag Lodge # 33 
POBuxiOOO 
Park Cirv, Utah 34060 ^ 
Fax Transmission Sheer 
Compan): 
fix: LS>*7 
R£:. jX/ (rA4»'f£ iSA/j) 
Dept: 
Td. 435.649.9865 fl*' 
an 8o:.*r*m: f 7v *<'/4-
Fax 435.649.6380 
fii^v 
From: 
Message: 
Please Note; 
No.. Pages: 
T^/Ui 
fas c-Hu iffT&t, y ^ ^ f#i><\ 
/ ^ r favfi F**"' 
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U privileged it\& confidential. 
It you are not the intended recipient you are hereby notified chat any dissemination of 
this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication tn 
error please notify us by telephone immediately xi che above number. Thank you. 
COO 2 4 
Tab 4 
08/19'?083 13:31 4356557473 
PAGE e;/ee 
601-6744012 oe* 
Toe Hank Rnflwell 
* * * 43W55-7479 
W»n«a435-64&-8011 
ihw Unfed P»kCrty Mines 
0UrjBfetf Otoltevtow 
Frome IraSocha 
£s$oet 8 
Itete 6/1*2003 
CO 
QftMat* Cwmumi 0 f ^ « i ^ a m UMftacycJ* 
Good Day Hank 
If you would please, make the corrections you reel necessary, based on 
your documentation or interpretation of the facts. Please do this at your 
earliest convenience and fax to me your corrections so that we may go 
forward with this issua Or. if you can show that this memo to Joe is 
wrong, I would be happy to back off] 
tf I do not hear from you, I will assume the facts mentioned are 
essentially correct <^¥ / - ^ . 
} he facts mentioned are A X 
A 5 <-7 
Best Wishes 
Ira Sachs 
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